Part
I Judicial Power............................................................................................ 9
Marbury v. Madison (1803) p. 4.................................................................................. 8
Martin v. Hunters Lessee (1816) p. 10...................................................................... 9
Cooper v. Aaron p. 12............................................................................................... 11
B. Congressional Power to Enforce and Expand
the Constitutional Rights 10
Civil Rights
Cases
.10
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
(1968)
.10
Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) p. 17.......................................................................... 11
Voting Rights Cases.................................................................................................... 12
The City of Rome v. United States (1980) p. 24......................................................... 12
Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) p. 24............................................................................... 12
Follilove v.
Klutznick (1980) p.25
13
Boerne v. Flores (1997) p. 26.................................................................................... 13
C. Limitations on the Judicial Power...................................................... 13
1. Congressional Control of Judicial Power................................ 14
Ex parte McCardle (1868) p. 28................................................................................ 14
United States v. Klein (1871) p. 31............................................................................ 15
Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society (1992) p.35
15
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor (1986) p. 35.............................. 16
2. Political Question Doctrine............................................................... 16
Baker v. Carr (1962) p. 42........................................................................................ 16
Goldwater v. Carter (1979)......................................................................................... 17
Powell v. McCormack p. 48...................................................................................... 18
3. The Case or Controversy Requirement....................................... 18
Article III § II: The judicial power shall
extend to all cases
and controversies
......................................................................................... 18
a. Advisory Opinions........................................................................................ 19
Muskrat v. United States (1911) p. 49....................................................................... 19
b. Ripeness: TOO EARLY..................................................................................... 19
United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947) p. 53........................................................ 19
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967) p. 56............................................................ 20
Poe v Ullman (1961) p. 57......................................................................................... 20
c. Mootness: TOO LATE.................................................................................... 20
Defunis v.
Odegaard (1974)
..20
Roe v. Wade
(1973)
..21
d. Standing:........................................................................................................... 21
i.
basic requirements.......................................................................................... 21
Warth v.
Seldin
.21
Village of
Arl Heights v. Metro Housing Devel Corp. (1977)
.22
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization (1976).............................. 22
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (1995) p. 77....................................................... 22
Miller
v.Johnson (1995
22
U.S. v. Hays (majority Black voting district) (1995).................................................. 23
ii. Third Party Standing:............................................................................. 23
Singleton v. Wulff (1976) p. 82......................................................................... 23
NAACP v.
Alabama (1958) p.85
23
Griswold
v. Connecticut (1965) p. 85
23
Eisenstadt
v. Baird (1972) p.86
..24
iii. Congressional Role in Standing................................................... 24
A. Congressional Removal of Prudential
Barriers................. 24
Assoc of
Data Processing Service Orga v. Camp (1970) p.87
.24
Bennett
v. Spear (1997) p.88
.24
B. Congressional Creation of Rights................................................ 25
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982)
p. 95................................................. 25
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)
p. 99.................................................... 25
iv. Taxpayer and Citizen Standing....................................................... 25
Frothingham
v. Mellon (1923) p.107
25
Doremus
v. Bd of Education (1952)
.26
Flast v.
Cohen (1968) p.110
26
Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War (1974)
26
US v.
Richardson (1974)
.. 26
Laird v.
Tatum (1972)
27
Valley
Forge Christian Coll v. Americans United for the Separation of Church &
State, Inc. (1982) p. 122 27
v. Legislator Standing................................................................................. 27
Coleman v.
Miller (1939)
..27
4. 11th Amendment and Sovereign Immunity................................. 27
b. The Young Doctrine................................................................................. 27
Ex Parte
Young (1908)
..28
Edelman v Jordan (1974) p. 129....................................................................... 29
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman (1984) p. 135..................... 29
Idaho v. Coeur dAlene Tribe of Idaho (1997)
p. 143..................................... 30
c. State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity......................................... 30
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.................................................................................................... 30
Implicit waiver of sovereign immunity............................................ 30
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989)
p. 150................................................. 31
Seminole
Tribe of Fl v. Fl (1996)
p.158
.32
D. THE PERSISTING CONTROVERSY OVER THE
JUDICIARY'S FUNCTION (pg. 170) 32
Interpretivism
v. Non-interpretivism
32
2.
The Fundamental Rights Debate (pg. 180)................................... 34
a.
The Privileges and Immunities of Citizenhip (pg. 180) Do we have
privileges and immunities not enumerated in the Constitution and if so, what
are they?................................................................................................................. 34
Corfiled
v. Coryell (1823)
.34
Do the Civil War amendments grant United
States citizens broad protection against the actions of state governments? 34
Slaughterhouse
Cases(1873)
. 35
Saenz v. Roe (1999).................................................................................................... 35
b.
The Rise of Substantive Due Process Review (pg. 194) The application of
due process, a traditionally procedural right binding the Fed government, to
create limitations on the substantive power of the state. Can the Court strike down laws interfering
with the right to make contracts?............................................................................................................................... 36
Loan
Assoc. v. City of Topeka (1874)
..36
Griswold
v. Conn (1965) Dissent
36
Munn v.
Illinois (1876)
..36
Railroad
Commission Cases (1886)
36
Mugler v.
Kansas (1887)
36
Allegeyer v. Louisiana (1897)..................................................................................... 37
Lochner v. New York (1905)...................................................................................... 37
Muller v.
Oregon (1908)
38
Traux v.
Corrigan (1921)
38
Baldwin
v. Missouri (1930)
38
Nebbia v. New York (1934)....................................................................................... 38
c.
Economic Liberty Since 1937 (pg. 207) What standard of review do we use
when economic rights are infringed on by a state law? 39
West Coast Hotel (1937)............................................................................................ 39
United Stateas v. Carolene Products Co. (1938)......................................................... 39
Olsen
v. Nebraska (1941)
..39
Whalen
v. Roe (1977)
40
E. ACCOUNTING FOR ECONOMIC RIGHTS-BEYOND
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (pg. 218)........................................................................................................................... 40
a.
The Contract Clause (pg. 218)-Private Contracts................. 40
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819).................................................................... 40
Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co. (1983)
.40
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus...................................................................... 41
Exxon Corp v. Eagerton............................................................................................. 42
b. Public Contracts (pg. 224) What happens when a state attempts to alter
its own contractural obligations?.................................................. 42
US Trust
Co. of NY v. NJ (1977)
..42
2.
The Taking Clause (pg. 227) Can government take private property or so
occupy or impact the use of property so as to diminish its economic and use
value?....................................................................................................... 43
a.
Physical Occupation - Appropriating private property for public use or
condemnation of private land for urban renewal pursuant to eminent domain
power. (pg. 228).......................................................................... 44
b.
Public Use (pg. 228)........................................................................................ 44
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984).................................................... 44
c.
Regulatory Taking (pg. 231) When does a purported regulation that
impacts the enjoyment, and economic use and value of private property become a
taking thereby necessitating compensation? 44
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922)..................................................................... 44
Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assn v. DeBenedicts (1987)
..44
Penn
Central Transportation v. NY city (1978)
.45
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)....................................................... 45
Dolan v. Tigard (1994)..................................................................................... 45
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council(1992)
.45&46
City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey (1999)
..46
F.
THE INCORPORATION CONTROVERSY (pg. 245)...................................... 46
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore (1883).................................... 47
Pierce v. Society (1925).............................................................................................. 47
Chicago
v. City of Chicago
...47
US v.
Carolene Products (1938)
47
Palko v. Connecticut (1937)............................................................................. 47
Adamson
v. California (1947)
...47
Duncan v.
Louisiana (1968)etal
.48
G. [SYLLABUS
READS THAT PAGES 256 - 350 BE SKIPPED]............................ 49
H.
POSTLUDE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW; PRELUDE TO LEGISLATIVE POWER (pg. 360) 49
McCulloch
v. MD (1819)
..49
Part II The Distribution of National
Powers (pg. 369).............. 49
Prize
Cases (1863)
.50
War
Powers Diagram
..50
A.
Establishing a Framework for Considering Power Relationships (p. 370) 52
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer...................................................... 52
B.
Locating Constitutional Boundaries of Executive Power (p. 387) 54
1.
Foreign Affairs (p. 387).............................................................................. 54
U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936)
(p. 387)................................................. 54
Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) (p. 389)......................................................... 55
2. Privileges and Immunities of Office (p.
396)................................ 56
US v.
Burr (1807)
..56
Miss v. Johnson (1866)
.56
Unites States v. Nixon....................................................................................... 57
Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services (1977)
.58
Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) (p. 407)............................................................................ 58
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (same day, 1982) (p.
408).......................................................... 58
Clinton v. Jones (1997) (p. 409)......................................................................... 59
C.The Necessary And Proper Clause (p. 413).......................................... 59
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) (p. 413)............................................................. 60
D. Defining Limits of Congressional
Delegation of Power (p. 420) 61
..... A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States (1935) (p. 420)...................... 61
Loving v.
US (1996)
..61
..... Yakus v. United States (1944) (p. 423).............................................................. 61
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (p. 425)....................................................................... 62
E. Defining Limits of Congressional
Continued Oversight (p. 428) 62
..... Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha (1983) (p. 428).................. 62
Bowsher
v. Synar (1986)
63
Morrison v. Olson (1988) (Ethics in
Government Act) (functionalist approach) (p. 443) 63
Humphreys Executor v. U.S. (1935) (p. 454)............................................................ 64
..... Mistretta v. United States (1988) (Sentencing Reform Act of 1984)
(functionalist approach) (p. 457) 65
Raines v.
Byrd (1997)
66
F. Allocating the Power between Congress and
the President to Make War (p. 465)................................................................................................................................... 66
Framing History (p. 466)................................................................................. 67
The Gloss of Practice (p. 467) (remember Frankfurters concurrence in
Youngstown?)............................................................................................. 67
Undeclared War (p. 468)................................................................................. 67
Part III
Power to Regulate or Affect the Economy................. 68
A. Fed Power
(p. 479)................................................................................................ 68
1. Seminal Principles (p. 479)..................................................................... 69
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) (p. 480).................................................................... 69
1 Article I § 8 [t]o regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes.................. 69
Paul v Virginia: (1868) (later overruled).................................................................... 69
Kidd v.
Pearson (1888)
..70
Daniel Ball (1870)..................................................................................................... 70
Kidd v. Pearson: (1888)............................................................................................. 70
2. Early 20th Century Analysis (p. 483)..................................................... 70
Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case) (1903)......................................................... 71
McDermott v. Wisconsin (1914)............................................................................... 71
Houston, East & West Railway v US (1914)
(p. 487)...................................... 72
Stafford v Wallace 1922............................................................................................ 72
Hammer v. Dagenhart.16 (Child labor case) (1918).......................................... 72
3. The Constitutional Crisis (p. 492)........................................................ 73
Carter v. Carter Coal (Coal price controls) (1936)............................................. 73
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (Union member firings) (1937)............. 73
4. Post-Switch Expansion of Fed Power (p. 496)............................... 74
US v Darby (1941)............................................................................................ 74
Kentucky
Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
.74
Mulford v. Smith (1939)............................................................................................ 74
Maryland v. Wirtz (1968)........................................................................................... 74
Wickard v. Filburn (little wheat grower-man)(1942)......................................... 75
US v. South Eastern Underwriters Assn (1944)....................................................... 75
5. Modern Cases (p. 504)..................................................................................... 75
a. Civil Rights....................................................................................................... 75
Heart of Atlanta v. US (Racist Atlanta Hotel) (1964)............................................... 75
Katzenbach v. McClung (Ollies racist Alabama
barbecue) (1964)............................ 76
b. Crime (p. 508)....................................................................................................... 76
Perez v. US
(1971) (Consumer Credit Protection Act - loansharking case)............... 76
c. Environmental Cases............................................................................... 77
Hodel v.
VA Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. (1981)
..77
6. A Revolution in the Offing? (p. 514).............................................. 77
US v. Lopez (Gun Free Zone Schools Act - 1990) (1995)........................................ 77
B. State Power to Regulate
(p. 525)............................................................. 78
1. Early Cases.................................................................................................... 78
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)................................................................................. 78
Plumley v. Commonwealth (1894)............................................................................ 78
Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) (p. 528).................................................... 79
Leisy v. Hardin (1890)............................................................................................... 79
Prudential Ins Co v. Benjamin (1946)....................................................................... 80
2. Burdens on Interstate Commerce (p.531).................................. 80
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros (State highway big
truck prohibition) (1938) 80
Southern Pacific v. Arizona (1945)................................................................... 80
Raymond
Motor Transportation v. Rice (1978)
80
3. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce................... 81
a. Incoming Commerce (p. 539)................................................................ 81
Baldwin
v. GAF Seelig (1935)......................................................................... 81
Welton
v. Missouri
(1875)......................................................................................... 81
Hunt v Washington Apple Commission (1977)......................................................... 81
Edwards v. California (1941)...................................................................................... 82
Henly v. Beer Institute (1989)................................................................................... 82
Dean Milk v. Madison (1951)........................................................................... 82
Maine v. Taylor (1986)............................................................................................... 82
Breard v. City of Alexandria (1951)........................................................................... 83
Philadelphia v N.J. (1978)................................................................................. 83
Exxon v. Maryland (1978)......................................................................................... 83
Minnesota v. Cloverleaf (1981)................................................................................. 83
Great Atlantic PacificTea v. Cottrell (Reciprocity Provisions)
(1976)........................ 84
New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach (1988).......................................................... 84
Sporhase v. Nebraska (1982)...................................................................................... 84
b. Outgoing Commerce................................................................................. 84
HP Hood v. Du Mond (1949).................................................................................... 84
Pike v Bruce Church Inc (1970)....................................................................... 85
Hughes v Oklahoma (1979)...................................................................................... 85
Cities Service Gas v. Peerless Oil and Gas (1950_.................................................... 85
Paker v Brown (1943)................................................................................................ 85
c. Recent Developments............................................................................. 86
Camps Newfound v Town of Harrison (1997).................................................. 86
4.Preemption 9...................................................................................................... 86
Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv
86
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal10 (1973)...................................................... 86
Hines
v. Davidowitz - 2 Penn v. Nelson. (1941) (1956).......................................... 87
Penn v.
Nelson (1956)
87
Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc. (1973)
87
5. State as a market Participant......................................................... 87
Reeves v.
Stake (1980)
..88
New
Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach (1988)?
..88
South
Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke (1984)
..88
6. Interstate Privileges and Immunities
(p.579) 12......................... 88
Baldwin
v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana (1978)
88
Toomer v.
Witshell (1948)
.88
Hicklin
v. Orbeck (1978)
89
Court of
NH v. Piper (1985)
89
United
Bldg & Construction Trades Council of Camden v. City of Camden
89
7.
INTERGOVERNMETNAL IMMUNITY
90
National League of
Cites v. Usery (1976)
.90
Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro Transit Authority (1985)
91
US v.
Prinz (1997)
.94
Alden v.
Maine (1999)
..95
A. THE POWER TO SAY WHAT
THE LAW IS
NOTE: Keep in
mind the significance of the 5 Ms as setting the stage for the recurring
themes of Constitutional Law (Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch
v. Maryland), particularly in establishing the courts power to be the final
judge of the Constitution.
JUDICIAL
REVIEW: The idea that
it is the Judiciary, and not Congress, which has the authority and the
duty to review the constitutionality of statutes passed by congress, and to
invalidate those statutes if they violate the Constitution
History: At this time in American history the separate branches of the Fed
government were still trying to understand their power
relationship. Moreover, prior to this case, the Supreme Court was
not highly respected
Marshall,
in essence was combating a case in which, if he were to decide in favor of
Marbury, he would have to rely on the current administration to respect and
obey the Courts ruling. The outcome in Marbury
essentially created and soundly self-validated the role of the Court as the
authority on the constitutionality of the laws, a position termed judicial
review.
Facts. Marbury (P) and
others were appointed justices of the peace for the District of Columbia by President Adams and
confirmed by the Senate on Adams' last day as
president. The new president, Jefferson,
instructed his Sec. of State, James Madison, not to deliver these signed
commissions. P brought a writ of
mandamus (a writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a govt
officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly) directly
to the Supreme Court under the §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
established United States courts and authorized the Supreme Court to issue
writs of mandamus to public officers.
Question Resolved:
Whether
a writ of mandamus could be granted under the
judiciary act, where the Judiciary act, passed by Congress, explicitly
authorizing issuance of a writ by the Court, and where such authority conflicts
with Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution (which does not grant the Court original jurisdiction over cases
like the one that was before the Court)
Marshall
also manages to bring up the question of who in the Fed government shall have the final say in interpreting the Constitution?
Marshalls decision:
ό Does Marbury have
a right to the commission: Marbury and the other justices had a
right to the commission once signed by the president
ό Is the Writ of
Mandamus an available remedy: Marshall distinguished
between political acts, which cannot be reviewed by the courts, and acts
specifically required by law, which can be reviewed refusal to deliver the
commissions, fell into latter category.
ό BUT the Mandamus
cannot be allowed
§ there is conflict
between the Judiciary Act and Art III §2.
§ Judiciary Act- grants the Court
the jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus
[to] persons holding office under
the authority of the US,
which would make the relief sought by Ps OK.
§ At Odds with
Constitution: Art III § 2, grants Court original jurisdiction only
cases affecting Ambassadors, public ministers and Consuls, and cases in which a
State is a Party. All other cases were under appellate jurisdiction
ό SUPREMACY OF
CONSTITUTION: If the Court identifies a conflict between the
constitutional provision and a congressional statute, the Court has the
authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse
to enforce it.
o Interlocking
arguments:
§ The Constitution
is paramount- the purpose of the Const. is to establish a fundamental
and paramount law. Any act of the legislature repugnant to the Const is VOID.
§ Who interprets:
duty of the Judicial Branch to say what the law is.
Criticism: Nowhere in the
Constitution is it stated that the Courts, and NOT Congress, is to decide the
constitutionality of a given statute.
Commentary: In more recent
times, the Court has asserted a broad judicial power, claiming the
responsibility of being the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Facts: British subject Martin (D) was heir to the Virginia estates of Lord
Fairfax, who died in England
in 1781. Through State a legislation confiscating the property of British
loyalists, Virginia
conveyed title to Hunter. Hunter's
lessee (P) brought an action of ejectment against Martin. D defended his title by virtue of two
Treaties between the US
and Britain
that protected such British-owned property.
The Virginia Court of Appeals sustained P's claim but was reversed by
the United States Supreme Court. The Virginia court refused
to comply with the reversal, and D again appealed.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court had appellate
jurisdiction over the highest State Courts on issues involving the
Constitution, Fed Laws, and Treaties?
Held: Yes. Two
principal stances to the Courts opinion:
ό State sovereignty
argument rejected: on grounds that the Const. lessens State sovereignty in
numerous respects. There is no reason to presume that State judiciaries were
immune from this particular set of limitations.
ό Uniformity: it is necessary to
have a uniform interpretation of the Constitution, Fed Laws, & Treatises
across the nation in order to avoid differing interpretations among the States.
Marshall thus with these early cases began to set the
idea that the Judiciary was in charge of creating rules of law that would be
binding on the all
Now does the idea that even if not announced by the
Constitution itself, or indisputably discernable from its drafting history, the
power of the Judiciary to say what the law is has hardened into
constitutional reality interfere with the congressional role of
law-making? The first simple answer is
that it is a part of the checks and balance system, but later cases will reveal
the dangers of this thin line between checking and balancing between the
branches and just flat-out deprivation of power.
Key Class notes:
- Hunters Lessee establishes the supremacy of
the Court over state court decisions.
- US Theory: not overly intrusive for US Court to
review state court decisions.
- This provides for uniformity
The
court has supreme and complete appellate power. It may discard states laws that
violate the Constitution or other Fed regulations.
*** Keep in mind that while the Court may not
answer political questions it may enforce Treaties.
Recent
challenges to Supreme Court Authority:
Cooper
expands Marbury to the point that the
Supreme Courts interpretation of the
law stands as the law of the land (interpretation = law)
Facts:
D,
the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas refused to abide by the Courts ruling
in Brown, to segregate the
public schools b/c to comply with the XIV Amend. Arkansas
officials claimed that they were not bound by a Lower Fed Court desegregation order.
Holding:
the
Fed judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and the Courts interpretation of the Constitution is
binding on a State and its Officials.
The
court itself has recognized that the XIII, XIV, and XV Amendments were
designed to change the Fed/state balance of power, affording the Fed
govt the authority to develop and implement a plan for moving toward
freedom and equality for Black Americans.
The
purpose of these Amendments: to provide congress with authority to enforce and
implement the Amendments rights.
Both
the 14th Amend, which prohibits slavery, and the 15th Amend, which guarantees
all citizens the vote, include a provision like the 14th Amends § 5, stating
that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article. Relying on this language, Congress has asserted
its power in each of these enforcement provisions to enact legislation beyond
the boundaries of rights defined by the Court.
NOTE: Congress in asserting its power of
enforcement as stated in the 14th Amendment needs only comply with the
NECESSARY and PROPER CLAUSE provided in Art. 1 § 8
The
Civil Rights Cases
Narrowly
construed
the reach of the 13th and 14th Amends in their applicability to private racial
discrimination. Although the Court held that the 13th Amend prohibits
slavery by either private or governmental entities, in the Civil Rights
Cases, the Court limited Congress ability to define and remedy the
badges of slavery.
- J.Bradley-took a narrow view of the power of Congress to enforce
the 14th Amend under its §5 power. It does not authorize Congress to
create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but
to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and
the action of state officers
- Dissenting
J.Harlan- both the 13th and 14th Amends conferred power
on Congress to legislate directly, at
least reaching private individuals engaged in quasi-public business.
- Next,
there seems to have been a shift towards viewing Congress enforcement
power broadly.
Remember: § 5 of the 14th Amendment grants
Congress the right to enforce the amendments by creating appropriate
legislation.
- Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
(1968)-
The court upheld a provision of the CRA of 1866 prohibiting race
discrimination in private transactions involving real and personal
property. The court held that the provision bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property and so construed, it was a valid exercise of the power of
Congress to enforce the 13th Amend. Reasoning: Congress power
to enforce the Amendment under §2s enabling clause clothed Congress
w/power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery in US.
- Runyon v. McCrary(1976)- in another provision of the 1866
Act, Congress could prohibit racial discrimination in the making and
enforcing of contracts, thereby constitutionally reaching purely
private acts.
- Prior to enactment of the Voting
Rights Acts of 1965- racially discriminating voting
practices could only be identified and removed on a case by case
basis, at great cost and with little impact. In 1965 Act, Congress
sought to promote systematic change by prohibiting certain
qualifications and requirements for voting.
- South Carolina v. Katzenbach
(1966)- The
court upheld § 4(a) and (b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which
temporarily suspended literacy tests in states or political subdivisions
with less than fifty percent of the persons of voting age registered to
vote. South Carolina
contended that the provision invaded the states province to regulate
voter qualifications and election procedures. The court found authority
for the provision in the 15th Amend, § 2.
- Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board (1959)-
7 yrs earlier, Court had concluded that a state may, consistent with the
15th Amend, condition the right of suffrage on literacy tests.
***
McCulloch v. Maryland, Let the end be legitimate and
within the scope of the Constitution and all the means appropriate which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. Pg. 18
Facts: New
York voting law requiring an ability to read and
write English as prerequisite to voting conflicts with Voting Right Act of
1965. Voting rights act prohibits denial
of voting rights to Puerto Ricans who have completed 6th grade
education in English or Spanish.
Issue: whether an Article III court must first
rule on the constitutionality of a state law before Congress can pass a law
that prohibits the state from regulating voting requirements.
Holding: No. Court concluded that § 5 of the
14th Amend authorized § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which invalidated
NY States literacy test as applied to persons who had completed the 6th grade
in Puerto Rico.
Rationale:
Congress
may pass appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions of the 14th
amendment and such legislation may override state statutes whether or not the
state statutes have been held as unconstitutional by an Article III court. Rationality
test: all it must do is be able to perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did, and there can be no
doubt that § 4(e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause.
Discussion:
If
congress only had the right to abolish state laws that are unconstitutional,
congress would lose the power granted by Appropriate Legislation clause
(Enabling Clause) of the 14th Amendment. This clause gives congress the same
broad power that the Necessary and Proper Clause
of Article I § 8 clause 18 gives i.e. to enact all necessary and proper
legislation to help enforce the Amendments. It is well within Congress
power to override any state legislation that interferes with the overall
purpose of the amendments.
Harlans
dissent: §
5 gives Congress wide powers in the field of devising remedial
legislation to effectuate the Amends prohibition on arbitrary state action,
but not every question is appropriate for congressional determination
because some questions are essentially judicial in nature. Congress jumped the
gun in exercising its broad remedial power.
The City of Rome
v. United States
(1980) p. 24
The
court held that Congress could prohibit electoral schemes with
discriminatory effects even as the Court itself concluded on the same day
that such schemes were not themselves violative of the 15th Amend.
Justice
Marshall: the
Acts ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate
method of promoting the purposes of the 15th Amend
Congress could
rationally have concluded that
it was proper to prohibit changes that have
a discriminatory impact.
The
court has continued to grapple with the reach of the congressional power
under enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments in several
other cases since Katzenbach v. Morgan.
Oregon
v. Mitchell (1970) p. 24
Facts:
court
considered challenges to the 1970 Voting Righs Act in which Congress attempted
to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 in Fed and state election, to extend its
prohibition of literacy tests to all state and Fed elections for 5 yrs, and to
eliminate state residency requirements in presidential elections.
Holding:
court
was fractured on the question of age requirements, but the court unanimously upheld
the literacy test prohibition as a proper means of implementing the
15th Amend under § 2. Brennan- emphasized Congress superior
fact-finding capability, as compared with the states led the Court to
defer to Fed policy choices over state choices; similarly, the Court would bow
to the choices of Congress instead of the Courts in light of Congress
capacity for fact-finding.
Dissent(Harlan)- acknowledged that Congress had
established a factual basis for finding discrimination and that literacy
tests could be tools for discrimination, in constructing the remedy, Congress
may paint with a much broader brush than the Court, which is restrained
by the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon
individual records.
The court also recognized far-reaching
congressional remedial powers in:
Fullilove v.
Klutznick(1980)
Reviewing the
broad treatment of Congress power in the voting rights cases, the Court
upheld a program requiring 10% of Fed funds granted for local public
works projects to be used by the state of local grantee to procure supplies for
services from minority businesses.
Burger concluded that the objectives of the program, to remedy
past discrimination perpetuated by prevailing procurement practices, were within
congressional power under the 14th Amend.
Concurring
(Powell)- observed
that Congress has been given a unique constitutional role in the enforcement
of the post-Civil War Amendments. In this case, where Congress determined
that where minority contractors were victims of discrimination and where
Congress chose a reasonably necessary means
to effectuate its purpose, there is no reason to invalidate the program.
****** More
recently, the court seems to be less willing to defer to Congress
judgment about the appropriate remedial responses to persistent racial
discrimination.
Recently, there is some doubt on the
Courts depiction of Congress power in Katzenbach v. Morgan.
Boerne v. Flores (1997) p. 26
Congress,
to justify its exercise of § 5 of the 14th amend must prove that there is a
rational relationship between a Fed statute and the end sought. The statute
must reflect a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.
The
Boerne court held that the challenged statutedesigned to prevent state
and local governments from infringing on religious freedomfailed this test,
as the legislative record failed to show large-scale violations of the
constitutional rule the statute was purportedly enforcing.
This
decision reflects the Courts willingness to examine carefully Congress
asserted grounds for exercising its § 5 authority, and suggest a further
cutback in Morgans deference to congressional judgment.
Despite
Marshalls
declaration that, it is empirically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is, the judicial power has always been
subject to limitations. Some of these limitations are constitutionally
imposed, while others are imposed by the court itself.
In
order for a case to be heard by the Fed courts, the P must get past a series of procedural
obstacles: (1) the case must not require the giving of an advisory opinion,
(2) the P must have standing, (3) the case
must not be moot, (4) the case must be ripe for a decision, and
(5) the case must not involve a non-justiciable political question.
Rule: Article
III, § 2, [T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as of
to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make. In other
words, Congress has the power to limit and regulate the appellate jurisdiction
of this court.
Given
that most cases arrive at eh Court by appeal, Congress control over the
Courts appellate jurisdiction creates the potential for abuse.
The
Court confirmed that Congress does indeed have at least some power to control
the boundaries of the Courts appellate jurisdiction.
Facts:
McCardle
was imprisoned by a military government imposed by Congress as part of
post-Civil War Reconstruction. He brought a habeas corpus action in Fed circuit
court, charging that the Reconstruction Acts under which he was imprisoned were
unconstitutional.
- Congress restricts appeal: Before a decision was handed down,
Congress passed a law repealing the portion of the 1867 Act which allowed
appeals to the Court. Thus Congress purported to deprive the Court
of its right to decide the McCardle case and any other habeaus corpus(a
writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure
that the partys imprisonment is not illegal) case coming to it by appeal
from the circuit courts.
Issue: Does Congress have the power to repeal
the appellate power of the Supreme Court?
Yes.
The
Court upheld Congress restriction of the Courts jurisdiction. The
decision that appellate jurisdiction is conferred with such exceptions and
under such regulations as Congress shall make. The limitation enacted by
Congress was such an exception. Therefore,
the court concluded, it had no jurisdiction to decide the case.
- Limited Withdrawal: The statute involved in McCardle,
Congress was not completely withdrawing the Courts right to hear habeas
corpus cases. Rather, it was withdrawing that right only where the
Court got the case by appeal from the lower courts; under jurisdictional
statutes of the time, an original petition for habeas corpus could
be commenced in the Court itself.
- Limited significance- does not by any means stand for the
proposition that Congress may strip the Fed courts in their entirety of
the right to issue habeas corpus relief; such congressional action
would probably be a violation of prisoners 14th Amend right to due
process.
- Neutral-congressional statute operated in a
neutral manner. Appeal to the Court is not allowed either to the
govt or to a private party; thus in a future case, it might be the govt
that suffers, which makes it less objectionable constitutionally.
United
States v. Klein (1871) p. 31
Facts: Klein sued in the Court of claims
under a Fed statute allowing citizens who had abandoned property to Fed troops
during Civil War to recover compensation for it, if they could satisfy a
loyalty requirement. Klein won in the court of claims, on the strengths of
earlier cases holding that a general presidential pardon satisfied the
statutory requirement that the claimant not have been a supporter of the
Confederacy. Before the govts appeal was heard in the Court, Congress passed a
new statute providing that a presidential pardon would show the opposite; the
statute also provided that the court of claims and the Court were both without
jurisdiction to decide cases where a pardon had been granted.
Holding:
The
Court in Klein struck down the statute as unconstitutional, on
the grounds that it violated the separation of powers and invaded the judicial
function.
Rule:
Any
jurisdictional limitation must be neutral; that is, Congress may not
decide the merits of a case under the guise of limiting jurisdiction.
- Practical Limitation: There is also a practical limitation
upon Congress ability to cut back on the appellate jurisdiction of the Court.
If Congress is motivated by hostility to a particular Court decision,
defeating its own purposethe adverse precedent will be left in the
books. Destroy UNIFORMITY.
Question: Does this ruling overrule Ex Part McCardle?
No
it adds a limitation to Congress power. Congress also has to abide by the
Constitution and the Constitution employed system where every branch is checked
and balanced. Congress cannot set limitation of a specific issue in order to
affect the outcome of a case.
Robertson
v. Seattle
Audubon Society (1992)
Facts:
An
environmental group sued the US Forest Service, alleging that its management of
old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest
violated provisions of 5 Fed environmental laws. While the lawsuit was pending,
Congress enacted a law imposing requirements on the Forest Service more lenient
than those imposed by the pre-existing statutes. Most importantly, the new
statute determined and directed that compliance with those new
requirements was adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the
statutory requirements that are the basis of pending lawsuits.
The
court upheld the statute against a Klein challenge, finding it to be simply a
run-of-the-mill statutory amendment.
Thus,
Seattle Audobon makes clear that, at least for statutory claims (where
Congress can rewrite the substantive law), Congress can in fact micromanage
courts application of law.
Rule: Congress has the power to establish
non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate certain types of common law
counterclaims so long as their function does not interfere with the function of
Article III Courts.
Facts: Congress created an independent agency
CFTC, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and gave them the authority to
enforce and implement the CEA Commodity Exchange Act. Schor filed complaints
against Conti Services, a broker. Schor alleged that his debit balance was the
result of Contis violations of the Act. Conti denied violating the CEA and instead counterclaimed to collect the
debt.
Schor sued, contending that the
provisions of Art III, § 1 prohibit Congress from authorizing the initial
adjudication of common law counterclaims by the Commission.
Rationale: The Court applied the following test to
determine whether the tribunal assumed Article III powers. Test whether the
agency has assumed article III powers
1.
Can
it issue writ of habeas corpus
2.
Is
the area particularized
3.
Does
it have complete authority over the matter; is the ruling binding even without
the review of a district court.
4.
Can
the parties seek remedy in other forums?
Self
imposed limitation on its power. Court
declines to entertain issues that are political in nature.
Political
question doctrine seems
to be a mesh of 2 principles:
1.
Separation of powers: as a constitutional matter, the court will not
decide matters which it concludes are committed by the Constitution to other
branches of govt for decision.
2.
Prudential concerns: court concludes that it is unwise, even if not
strictly unconstitutional, for it to decide.
***
Apportionment cases are justifiable under the 14th Amendment but not
under the Guaranty Clause in Article IV § 4
Facts: P Baker wants to sue D State of
Tennessee, for failing to properly proportion its legislative districts. P claims that the state electoral district is
mal-apportioned and so is inconsistent with the Constitution? ArtIII
§ 2- There is discussion of equal protection
clause 14th Amendment.
Holding: Court declines to hear case ruling that
the issue presented is a political question.
Article IV § 4 (Guaranty
Clause) The United States
shall guarantee to every state in the Union a
Republican form of government
It is not for the court to decide what a
Republican form of government is.
Brennan
distinguishes political questions from political cases. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
political questions not one of political cases.
Brennan
gives 6 Factors, at least one of which must be present in order to make
an issue a non-justiciable political question:
1.
Commitment to another branch: A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political question
2.
Lack of standards: A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving the issue
3.
Unsuitable policy determination: The impossibility of deciding [the
issue] without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion
4.
Lack of respect for other branches: The impossibility of a courts
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due co-ordinate branches of government.
5.Political
decisions already made: An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made.
6.
Multiple pronouncements: The potential for embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Factors
or issues considered to be political questions:
a. Foreign
Relations,
the court cannot enter into treaties but it can resolve cases where a state law
violates a Fed treaty i.e. Martin v. Hunter Lessee.
b.
Dates of duration of Hostilities, Court cannot declare
war of determine when to end a hostile confrontation. However it can take into
consideration the state of the country during this time and set certain laws to
protect the citizens from the evils that arise out of the war i.e. enforcing
public programs that lower the cost of housing during times of war.
c.
Validity of enactment, it cannot decide how long a proposed
amendment to the Constitution should remain open to ratification.
d.
The Status of Indian Tribes - It cannot answer whether a tribe should
be recognized as an Indian Tribe.
e.
Republican Form of Government - Court cannot question the structure of
the government.
Case
involves the challenge of President Carters termination of a treaty with Taiwan and his
recognition of the Peoples Republic of China. Court held that this was a political
question because it involves the authority of the Pres in the conduct of
our countrys foreign relations(need for a unified voice).
Powell
v. McCormack p. 48
Facts: Powell was elected to the United States
House of Representatives but was refused a seat by the House for misconduct.
Rationale: Court held that this was a
justiciable constitutional issue the Court agreed with Powell. Art I §5
was at most a grant to Congress of the right to determine whether the 3
standing qualifications set forth in Art I, §2 were satisfied.
Therefore, Congress had not been given the right to impose additional
qualifications for membership.
Article III, §2 II, contains perhaps the most
important limitation of the judicial power: the case or controversy requirement. This limitation has spawned
multiple restrictions on the scope of judicial authority including the
prohibition against advisory opinions, the ripeness and mootness doctrines, and the standing requirement.
A case is defined as a suit instituted
according to the regular course of judicial procedures.
Marbury v. Madison
For
a controversy to exist, the parties
must have adverse interests. Muskrat v. United States.
There
must be an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights. Chicago & G.T.Ry. Co.
v. Wellman.
Fed Courts may not give advisory opinions, that is, opinions which give
advice about particular legislative or executive action, when no party is
before the court who has suffered or imminently faces specific injury.
Reasons for not giving advisory opinions:
1. Need for focused controversy: in addition to separation of
powers rationale, the ban on AO is also frequently justified by the need to
have the judiciary decide only focused,
specific conflicts, in which adversaries explore every
aspect of the situation.
2. Finality: interest in having judicial opinions be final, and not subject to modification by the executive or legislative
branch.
3. Strict Necessity: such issues
ill not be decided unless strictly necessary.
- Except Declaratory
judgment: allowed review when they are reasonably concrete.
However, Fed cts created pursuant to Art III are barred by the
case-or-controversy requirement from deciding abstract, hypothetical
or contingent questions.
Muskrat v. United States
(1911) p. 49
Parties: Muskrat questions the validity of an
act passed by congress assigning land that was granted to the Cherokee Indians
in a previous statute to three other tribes.
Holding: the P has not asserted any actual private
parties have or will suffer injury in fact but has simply asked the court to
decide if the statute is valid and constitutional. This question is one that
should be answered by congress not the court. Although, the US is named as
a D in this action, it has no interest adverse
to the claimants.
Rule: a party must present an actual case
that warrants adjudication. A hypothetical threat is not enough. A case will be regarded as not yet ripe (and
therefore not yet justiciable) if it has not yet become sufficiently concrete to be worthy of adjudication.
Facts: the Ps in Mitchell were Fed civil
servants who wished to attack the Hatch Act, which prohibits Fed
executive-branch employees from involvement in political management
or
political campaigns. The Ps claimed, in essence, that they desired
to engage in prohibited political activities; however, all but one conceded
that they had not yet done so.
Holding:
Justice Reed the
power of the cts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises
only when the interests of litigants require the use of the judicial authority
for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical
threat is not enough.
Dissent
(J.Douglas): What
these appellants propose to do is plain enough
that they will be
discharged. Not hypothetical
its actual.
Facts: Fed statute requires Plaintiffs, drug
manufacturers, to print established names of drug products half as large as
the proprietary name. Actual brought by 37 drug manufacturers challenging the
authority of the Commissioner to require the addition of the established name
to packaging and printed materials.
Holding:
Two principal factors in ripeness inquiry: (1) the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration. Therefore, court held that they had established
ripeness.
- Court elaborated several factors:
1.
whether delayed review would cause hardship to the Ps
2.
whether judicial intervention would inappropriately interfere with further
administrative action; and
3.
whether the cts would benefit from further factual development of the issues
presented.
Facts:
2
married couples and a physican challenged the Conns anti-contraceptive law.
Rule:
Court refused to hear the case on appeal, on the ground that the statute
had been on the books for 80 yrs with only one reported prosecution and that
there was thus not the requisite clear threat of prosecution.
c. Mootness: TOO LATE
Rule: A case is moot if it raised a
justiciable controversy a the time the complaint was filed, but events
occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of an ongoing stake
in the controversy.
Defunis v. Odegaard (1974) (p.
61)the court rules that P, who was
already in his third year in law school at the time his appeal is reviewed, can
no longer sue the D for
admittance into the law school. Dissent: Illness, economic necessity, or academic failure could prevent his graduation, leaving the prospect
that he might then be required to face the hurdle of the admissions policy.
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Where a woman who is pregnant attempts to adjudicate a claim to declare
her right to have an abortion, the matter is not moot even if she is no longer
pregnant because plaintiff may get pregnant again and the 9 month gestation
period makes it impossible for a pregnant woman to vindicate her reproductive
rights.
Article by Chen (1998)
o I-200
barring race and sex-based preferences in the public sector.
o Bakke
does not state that race can be taken into account, which is in contradiction
to I-200.
o Smith
v. U of Washington Law School (2000)- students suing the U for not admitting
into the program. On 5/01 the Writ was denied.
o Once
I-200 has been passed the U of Washington is no longer free to look at race and
sex in making a decision on an application.
(1)
Plaintiff
must be injured
(2)
the
defendant must cause the injury and
(3)
the
injury must be redressable by the court.
Case must be concrete an particularized and
actual and imminent
Who
is kept out by the standing rule?
1.
Non-individuated harmwhere
the harm is suffered by a large number of people not before the court. Ex. if P only connection with the suit is that
he is a citizen or tax-payer.
2.
Third parties rightswhere
the rights claimed to be violated are not the rights of the P, but instead the right of the third
party.
Warth v. Seldin
(1975) p. 66show the causation requirement.
Rule: Causation
requirement has 2 components: (1) the challenged action was a but for cause
of the injury, in the sense that the injury would not have occurred unless
the challenged action had taken place; and (2) a favorable decision in the
suit will redress the injury.
Facts:
The Ps in Warth were a number of
parties who claimed to have been injured by the zoning rules of Penfield, NY.
They claimed that these rules had been imposed for the purpose of excluding the
bldg of low- and moderate-income housing in the town. The P fell into a number of categories 2 of
which were: (1) low-income seekers of housing (2) real estate developers.
Held:
Court dismissed each claim for lack of standing.
(1)
Minorities
and poor could not show that they would be able to move into the area in the
absence of the ordinance. No actual injury to P.
(2)
Tax-payers
in adjacent community could not prove injury caused by D because the taxes were raised by their
own municipality not by Penfield. Injury
not caused by D
(3)
Building
contractors could not show that but for the ordinance they had a specific
project that was precluded by the statute. No
actual injury by P.
Village of Arl Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Develp Corp. (1977).
Facts: The court
considered an equal protection challenge to a municipalitys zoning decision
effectively prohibiting a non-profit housing developer from bldg a federally
subsidized housing complex in the village. Ps were the
developer and African-American individual who testified that he would likely
become a resident of the complex it was built.
Holding: both Ps
had standing. The developer unlike Warth, had
advanced quite a way toward completion. The
individual, wanted to live in the area of the complex, would likely move into
the complex, and would qualify as a resident. There was an actionable
causal relationship between the injury suffered by the Ps and Ds action.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization (1976)
Court
held that plaintiffs lacked standing where Internal Revenue Service
Ruling allowed favorable tax treatment to a non-profit hospital that offered
only emergency room services to indigents.
Ps could not prove that hospitals had
already discriminated against them. Our
decisions make clear that an organizations abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an
adjudication does not substitute for the concrete
injury required by Art. III.
Court
held that construction company had standing
to sue where it established that a Fed law awarding tax breaks to
contractors using subcontracting companies owned by socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals would likely cause him concrete and particularized and actual or eminent (not conjectural or hypothetical) harm.
Miller v. Johnson (1995)
Facts:
involved
a challenge to Georgias
congressional redistricting plan. Under the prodding of the Justice Dept., the Georgia
assembly created 3 majority black districts. 5 white voters who resided
in a majority-black district sought to challenge the district.
Holding:
Court
concluded that the P had standing. The court decided that
the White voters in GAs 11th Congressional Dist have a standing to
maintain a Shaw claim appears to rest on a theory that their placement in the
11th Dist caused them representational harms. Court equates Shaw
claims with the desegregation decision in this case.
Dissent:
Respondents
have alleged no legally cognizable injury, they lack standing, and these cases
should be dismissed. Desegregation causes redressed the exclusion of black
citizens from public facilities reserved for whites. In contrast, any voter,
black or white, may live in the 11th Dist. What respondents contest
is the inclusion of too many black voters in the dist. as drawn. If respondents
allege no vote dilution, that inclusion can cause them no conceivable injury. There
is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradiate racial subordination.
U.S.
v. Hays (majority Black
voting district) (1995)
Case
involved challenge to majority-Black voting districts in Louisiana.
Court held that racial composition of a particular voting
district, without more, does not violate the Constitution. Ps failed to show that they suffered
requisite injury for standing.
The
general rule against third-party standing is founded upon discretionary or
prudential considerations, and is not mandated by the Art III case or
controversy requirement.
The
1st Amend overbreadth doctrine can be viewed as an exception to the
rule against assertion of a third-partys rights.
Test:
(1) What
is the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he is trying to
assert
(2) What
is the ability of the third party to assert his own right?
Facts: Group of doctors challenged a state
statute that prohibited the use of public health insurance for abortions not
necessary to protect mothers health.
Held:
A doctor has standing to sue on behalf of patient because of privilege
relationship that exists between them. The doctors can also establish standing
because they stand to suffer financial detriment because the statute provides
that they cannot receive payment for performing certain abortion on women who
have public medical insurance.
NAACP v. Alabama (1958)
p. 85
Held: Organizations can sue on behalf of
their members because the members are essentially the organization.
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
p. 85
Held:
Director
of Planned Parenthood has standing to sue on behalf of married couples who are
prohibited, by state law, from receiving contraceptives. The P was fined $100 for giving married
couple information and advice on preventing conception.
Eisenstadt v. Baird
(1972) p. 86
Held: Court held that P who distributed contraceptives in
violation of state law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried couples had standing.
Congress
can authorize Ps to bring suit when standing would not
otherwise exist. The restraint of the
court is self-imposed, but Congress may invite the Court to hear a particular
type of case.
Article
III (case or controversy) v. Prudential Limitations- Congress is not free to override the
Court as to an element of standing found by the court to fall within the case
or controversy requirement, but it is free to override the prudential
considerations.
Ψ Association
of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp (1970)
p. 87
Facts:
Involved
a date processing services company that is challenging a ruling by the resp.
Comptroller of the currency that, as incident to their banking services,
national banks may perform date processing services for other banks and to bank
customers.Congress enacted Administrative Procedure Act which allowed person aggrieved by agency actions who had aesthetic or recreational interest in the
matter to sue. Challenge based on competition by the bank.
Holding:
Had
standing. The question of standing is different and involves, apart from
the case or controversy test, concerns whether the interest sought to be
protected by the P is arguably within the zone of
interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question. Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act grants
standing to a person aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the
relevant statute. That interest may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational as well as economic values.
Ψ Bennett
v Spear
(1997) p. 88
Facts:
A
challenge to a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service in
accordance with the endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), concerning the
operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project by the Bureau of Reclamation, and
the projects impact on 2 varieties of endangered fish.
Holding:
Standing. Standing
involves constitutional limitations on fed. court. jurisdictions and prudential
limitations.
Reqt
of standing: P must, generally demonstrate that:
1. has suffered injury in fact
2. the injury is fairly traceable to
the actions of the D
3. the injury will likely be
redressed by a favorable decision
Unlike
constitutional limitations, prudential limitations can be modified by
CONGRESS. One of these prudential reqts is the zone of interest
testsought to be remedied.
Facts: Black P sued realty company for racial steering
in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
D told P that he did not have vacancy in his
building. P sent 2 testers, a white male and a
black male. D assured the white male there was
vacancy. Black male was told that there
was not.
Holding: The black tester can sue because he had
the right to truthful information about housing. White tester cannot sue because he was not
lied to. Congress granted any persons the right to truthful information
about available housing.
Facts:
Ps challenge certain Fed agency action
that, they say, will have the effect of endangering certain species abroad.
Endangered Species Act of 1973 originally applied to foreign and domestic
animals--amended the law to exclude foreign animals.
Holding:
Ps have not shown the requisite actual
or imminent harm. The injury in fact must be actual or imminent. Thus
if the threatened harm is too far in the future, or too speculative, the
actual or imminent element will not be satisfied, and no STANDING.
General Rule:
Individuals do not have standing based upon their status as citizens or
taxpayers. Frothingham. R. before
1968.
Exceptions:
A taxpayer may challenge the constitutionality of a Fed taxing or
spending program if there is a logical nexus between the status [of
taxpayer] and the claim. Where the taxpayer attacks a Fed statute on the ground
that it violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. Flast This exception is very narrow, seemingly
applying only to case with almost identical facts.
Ψ Frothingham
v. Mellon
(1923) p. 107
In
general a taxpayer does not have the standing to sue the Fed government
mismanagement of Fed funds. Reasoning that the P-taxpayers interest in the moneys of
the Treasury [is] shared with millions of others [and] is comparatively minute
and indeterminable.
Doremus
v. Bd of Education (1952)
Facts:
involved
an Establishment Clause challenge to Bible reading in the NJ public schools. 1 P was the parent of a child subjected to
the Bible readings, and both Ps claimed that they were taxpayers
burdened by the requirement.
Holding:
Child
had graduated and court determined standing on the issue was moot. No standing
b/c no evidence that there was a separate tax or addl cost of the running of
the program therefore, no injury-in-fact.
Dissent:
J.
Douglas if public school was being used for a purpose other than what the $ was
raised for, that was an adequate interest and should be heard on the merits; no
other parents would be able to provide any better evidence rule.
Ψ Flast
v. Cohen, 382 US 83 (1968) p. 110
Facts:
Mrs.
Flasts claim was that a Fed-aid-to-education act, by giving financial aid to
religious schools, violated the First Amendments Establishment Clause.
Holding:
a
taxpayer may challenge the constitutionality of a Fed taxing or spending program
if there is a logical nexus betw. the status [of taxpayer] and the
claim. Nexus satisfied in Flast.
Nexus requires:
(1)
the
statute relies on Congress power under the Taxing and Spending Clause of
Art I, § 8, rather than being merely an incidental expenditure of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory; and
(2)
that
the challenged law violates specific constitutional limitations imposed
on that Taxing and Spending Power, not simply that the statute is
generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art I, § 8.
Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War (1974)
Facts:
Ps challenged the reserve membership of
Congress as violating the Incompatibility Clause (Art I, § 6, clause 2- no
senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil office under the authority of the US.) and
depriving US citizens of the faithful discharge by members of Congress who are
part of Reserves.
Holding:
No
standing. This is an interest shared by all citizens. It is also speculative
and thus, an abstract injury.
Rule:
Case
in which the harm complained of by the Ps is no different from that
suffered by very large numbers of people not before the court. Not
shown individualized injury-in-fact required of standing.
US v. Richardson (1974)
Facts:
involved
a taxpayers challenge to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which
allowed the government to conceal CIA expenditures from the general public.
Respondent, suing as a citizen and a taxpayer, sought a detailed statement of
CIA expenditures after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain such information
from various governmental agencies. Claimed he was entitled to such statement
by virtue of Art I § 9, of the Constitution.
Holding:
No
standing. No claim that appropriated funds are being spent in violation of a
specific constitutional limitation upon the taxing and spending power.
Rule:
In a taxpayer action, only those constitutional provisions, which act as
specific limitations on the Taxing and Spending power of Congress may be
relied upon.
Laird v. Tatum (1972)
Facts:
involved
a claim that the Department of the Army had engaged in surveillance of lawful
and peaceful civilian political activity. Respondents alleged that surveillance
had a chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
Holding:
No Standing. Allegations of a subjective chill are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm.
Ψ Valley Forge
Christian College
v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc. (1982)
p. 122
Facts:
the
Fed govt. donates surplus real estate to D, a religious college. Ps, suing as both taxpayer and citizens,
asset that this gift violated the Establishment Clause.
Holding:
Ps lack standing, because the
governmental action was authorized not by the Taxing and Spending Clause, by
rather, by the Property clause (Art IV, §3, Cl.2). Therefore, the Flast exception
to the general rule against taxpayer standing does not apply.
Rule:
Today,
probably only suits virtually identical to Flast (suits alleging that
congressional action taken under the Taxing and Spending law violates the
Establishment Clause) may be brought by taxpayers.
V.
Legislator Standing
Coleman
v. Miller (1939)
Facts:
involved
the proposed Child Labor Act amendment to the US Constitution. Kansas Secretary of
State endorsed a resolution with the notation that it had been passed by the
legislature. 21 members of the Kansas Senate sued to force the Secretary of
State to change his endorsements to not passed on the basis that the
Lieutenant Government had, without authority, cast the deciding vote. Ps also claimed that the amendment was
ratified within a reasonable period of time.
Holding:
Standing.
These senators have a plain, and direct and adequate interest in
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.
Dissent:
All
Citizens, in KS and US, have that interest, not just senators.
11th Amendment-the Judicial power of the US shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State. Adopted in
reaction to Chrisholm v. Georgia
(1793).
11th
Amendmentbars suits:
1. by a citizen against his or her own
state. Hans v. Louisiana
(1890)
2. covers Fed question suits, not
just diversity suits.
3.
that
a state may not be sued even by its own
citizens, and may not be sued even in a case raising a Fed questionis now held
to be a core constitutional limitation on Fed judicial power.
4.
applies
not only to suits at law, but also to suits at equity. Thus a
private citizen cannot sue to have a state enjoined or ordered to do something,
any more than she can sue to recover damages.
Exclusions:
1. Suits against officials for
injunctions-Ex parte Young (1908).
2.
Suits against official for money damages, as long as the damages are to be paid
out of the officials own pocket.
3.
Suit for injunction against violation of state law-Pennhurst v. Halderman
(1984)
4.
Suits by Fed government
5.
Suits against cities- or
any subdivision of the state.
6.
State agencies and other entities
7.
Suits by one state against another
8.
Suits in state court
9.
Waiver by State
10.
Suits under the post-Civil War Amendments
Test: In
order to find that Congress has properly abrogated the States 11th
Amendment immunity from suit by their own citizens, it must be shown that:
1.
The
abrogation is express and intended in the Fed statute.
2.
Congress
has acted within its constitutional power in enacting the law.
Note:
Congress may not abrogate the States 11th Amendment immunity
from suit based upon its Article I
powers.
Note:
The 14th Amendment is meant to
broaden Congress power to legislate pursuant to its stated goals; evidenced by
the appropriate legislation clause of the amendment. (see § 5 of 14th
Amendment.) Such abrogations will usually occur under this amendment.
Ex Parte Young
(1908) when a state officers official conduct violates the US Const. or
a Fed statute, he is acting without true authority, and his conduct is
therefore not really state conduct for purposes of the 11th Amendment.
Ψ Edelman v Jordan (1974) p. 129- Implicitly assumes that states should be governed by Art
III.
Rule:
Where
the State would be the real party in interest by virtue of having to pay
damages out of State coffers, a citizen may not sue the State, even in a state
officials name.
Facts: Plaintiff sued Illinois state officials for violating 14th
Amendment by improperly administering Fed-state programs for Aid to the Aged,
Blind and Disabled. Fed District Court
ordered Ds to pay retroactive benefits for the misuse of the fund.
Held:
- Ford Motor Co. v. Dept of Treasury determined that where state is
implicated, even if not named, it may be barred by 11th Amen. & Fed
regulation.
- Young is only for prospective, not
retroactive benefits b/c otherwise the state would be liable for damages.
It is also for non-monetary relief b/c otherwise, the state would be
liable.
- The lower courts held this to be an
action of equitable restitution, but SC said that it still required
monetary compensation from the Revenues of the State.
Note: Does not overrule Ex Parte Young
because the relief sought in Young was prospective in nature and not
amount to money damages against the State.
Dissent
(Douglas): Young allows injunctive
relief. Just b/c it affects the treasury is not a good enough reason. Other
cases (Rosado v. Wyman - welfare) affect the state funds. Whether it is
prospective or retrospective, it is the same in actions of equity & nothing
in the 11th Am. differentiates b/w it and law. A state can have
half-immunity. Where a state has consented to Fed-state co-operative project,
it is realistic to conclude that the State has agreed to assume its obligations
under the legislation. (Brennan):
1)disagrees w/ Hans interpretation, therefore, the IL citizens can sue IL. 2)
IL cannot assert ancient doctrine of sov. immunity b/c they waived it upon
entering the Convention, therefore no protection for Fed issues.
Ψ Pennhurst
State School
& Hospital v. Halderman
(1984) p. 135
Facts: Ps brought suit for injunctive relief on
the basis that the residents of PSSH had rights violated under state law
(Mental Health & Mental Retardation Act). Lower court determined that the
Young doctrine applies to violations of state law also.
Holding: The claim that petitioner violated the
state law in carrying out their official duty at Pennhurst is one against the
state and is therefore barred by the eleventh Amendment.
Rationale: Where a state official misinterprets a
state regulation, it is up to the court to issue injunctive and declaratory
relief but it is not up to the court to strip the state of the authority to
implement and enforce state laws.
Dissent
(Stevens)- Monaco
v. Miss
& Hans v. LA adopted the ancient doctrine of state sovereignty to
expand the 11th Amend.
Ψ Idaho
v. Coeur dAlene
Tribe of Idaho (1997)
p. 143
Facts: The tribe sought declaratory judgment
to establish its entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy of land as well
as the invalidity of Idaho
regulations allowing state use and regulation of such land.
Rationale: The young doctrine applies to cases
that call for interpretation of Fed law. Where a case questions the state laws
it must bring its suit in a state forum.
o Young invoked when: no state forum
available to vindicate fed. interest & to interpret fed. law.
o Usually, prospective relief is
sufficient to invoke Young principle, but this is unusual b/c a quiet title
action implicates a special sovereign interest. We must examine its effect on
the state first.
o The states interest in its land &
waters would be affected as intrusively as a retroactive levy on treasury funds
b/c it would bar the states officer
form exercising their gov. power over waters deemed by the state to be an
integral part of their territory.
Dissent: disagrees w/interpretation of Young
b/c it unnecessarily narrows it- it should be a straightforward test of
1)prospective & 2) ongoing violation of Fed law. Discussing state forum
availability narrows doctrine, and & no need to address Fed interpretation.
Otherwise it is a case-by-case analysis of several factors. A declaratory
judgment is not the equivalent to granting title, so Young does not apply. Here
the state would be divested of its regulatory powers.
Rule: A state implicitly consents to being
sued for violations of statutes pursuant to § 5 of the 14th
Amendment.
427
US
445 (1976) p. 148
Facts: Male employees of CT state claimed
that CT State Employment Retirement Act violated Title VII b/c of their sex.
Lower court allowed claim b/c it was prospective & permissible according to
Edelman.
Holding: The 11th amendment does not
shield the states from congress § 5 authority to authorize Fed court to allot
private citizens money damages.
Congress
can do whatever the F**k it wants under the § 5 Necessary and Proper clause
found within the 14th Amendment.
Discussion: the substantive provisions in the
amendments are directed specifically at the states. It commands that it is
their duty to insure that private citizens are not discriminated against. To
assure that the states adhere to the provisions congress created § 5 to give
them the power to enact any necessary legislation needed to enforce the
amendments.
***States
must follow the law of the land, the Constitution if they refuses to due so
their consent to being sued. Enforcement of the amendments are do not invade
state immunity because the amendments are the supreme law, the Constitution,
and so
States
must adhere to them.
Ψ Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co. (1989) p. 150
**Plurality decision
Court
held that citizens may sue under the Commerce Clause of Article I.
Note:
Later overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
Facts: Union Gass predecessor had plant that
produced coal tar as a by-product. State (PA) was excavating that area &
struck the tar deposit. The EPA said it was hazardous & fed.govt. cleaned
it up but sued U/G for cost. U/C impleaded Fed govt. pursuant to CERCLA &
SARA 42 USC §9607(a).
Issues:
(1)
Was Congress unmistakably clear? Yes. CERCLA clearly permits suits for
money damages against States.
(2)
Did Congress act pursuant to a valid power? (i.e § 5 of 14th Am.) Yes. Similar to Fitzpatrick, Commercial
clause is not invasion of state sovereign immunity. It is parallel w/ 14th
Amendment; every increase in fed. power corresponds to a decrease in state
power & it makes no difference that 14th amend did it in 2 steps (sec.1
& sec. 5) but the Com. clause does it in one. To the extent that the
states gave Congress authority to regulate commerce, they relinquished
immunity.
Congressional
power would be incomplete if the State was not liable in damages. Doesnt
outright overrule Hans v. LA, but considers its validity.
Dissent
(Scalia & al.):Brennans opinion requires that we overrule Hans, and he
declines to do so. Whereas the post Civil War amends were avowed directly
against the States (thus subject to waiver), the antecedent (prior) clauses
were not. The 11th Am modified Art. III jurisdiction & the Comm.
Cl. If there was an implicit waiver for that Art., then why not for all the
others?
Brennans
response: 11th am is expansive b/c it incorporates doctrine of sov.
imm, (otherwise the language is only procedural). The Constitution is
antecedent to the 11th am, but not to the principle. Congress always
had this authority to abrogate sov. immunity.
Ψ Seminole
Tribe of Florida
v. Florida (1996) p. 158
FACTS:
Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act imposes a duty to states to negotiate in good faith &
authorize tribes to bring suit in fed. court. against states to compel that
duty.
Issue
1) Has State immunity been abrogated by Congress?
a)
unmistakably clear? YES.
b)
pursuant to a valid exercise of power? NO.
Fitzpatricks
source of 14th Am is valid. Union Gas is overruled (but its
rationale would have allowed Seminole to recover). Adopts Union Gas Dissents
reasoning (Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify limitations on the principle
embodied in the 11th Am through appeal to antecedent provisions of
the Constitution).
Issue
2) Does the Young Doctrine apply?
Court
should hesitate where Congress has prescribed a remedial scheme for a State
statutory duty. Congresss remedy is much narrower than what would have been
allowed under Young doctrine, indicating that they did not want Young remedies
to be available.
*Dissent
(Souter): 11th Am was intended to prevent suits based solely on
diversity.
Rule (Rhenquist): Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area, the 11th Amend
restricts the judicial power under Art III, and Art I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon Fed jurisdiction. Radically
newand restrictedview of Fed power.
Citizens
may not sue states based upon Article I Commerce Clause.
Holding: the Indian Commerce Clause does not
grant congress the power to abrogate a states sovereign immunity.
There
is a persisting controversy over the judiciary exercise of its power,
particularly where it strikes down legislation when it conflicts w/ a right not
specifically enumerated.
Interpretivism &
Non-Interpretivism:
Interpretivists: bases in literalism, originalism &
neutrality of principle.
Non-interpretivists: develops rights & liberties, even
if not enumerated and trades in natural law.
Calder v. Bull (1798)
Anti-
non-Interpretivist (Iredell) view:
-
court
does not have power to declare natural law. Art III doesnt have power to do
this.
-
policy
of America
to guard against such an evil by defining w/ precision the objects of leg.
power
-
cannot
pronounce legislation void b/c of courts judgment that is against natural law
-
natural
justice has no fixed standard, it varies among men
Note: not
interpretivist b/c doesnt stick to text expressly, rather he is anti-Chase
Non-interpretivist
(Chase) view:
-
the
constitutions were erected to establish justice & the purposes for which
men enter society will determine the nature & terms of the social compact
-
there
are certain vital principles which determine a flagrant abuse of power
-
an
act contrary to these principles cannot be a rightful exercise of legislative
authority
Fletcher v. Peck(1810)
SC declared
revocation of state land grant invalid based on principles common to our free
institutions. The concurring opinion bluntly based its reason on natural law.
Other
examples -
Dred
Scott (1857): Fundamental right to own slaves prior
to Civil War based on natural law.
Lochner
v. N.Y. (1905): Economic liberty b/c natural law
Griswold
v. Connecticut
(1965): Right to privacy
Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896): Official segregation was the order of things
Constitutional
Turf Wars: Competing for the Consent of the Governed
Donald E.
Lively (1991)
1. Literalism (Strict
Constructionism)-
Text is the
starting point, and whenever possible, the ending point of constitutional
review.
- Not helpful if the text is unclear or
its meaning disputed
- The delineation of power (i.e
Congresss power to regulate interstate commerce) is imprecise (it could
include economic rights, civil rights, criminal conduct).
- Basic individual rights are inexact
(freedom of speech, or of the press). Terms such as unreasonable, speedy,
impartial, excessive, cruel, unusual, due, equal are very imprecise.
-
It
is intended to be non-political but has proved a useful too to advance
politicism (Nixon, Regan, Bush campaigns promised to appoint judges that would
interpret Const. as written).
2.
Originalism-
When literalism
fails, as it invariably does, originalism is the next alternative: an inquiry
into official purpose, search for original intent.
-
delusional
b/c the LEG is made up of diverse individuals & competing aims/agendas
-
used
particularly for Equal Protection which makes it less of a guarantee for
minorities.
-
hard
to understand intent b/c based on what was meant at the time
3.
Neutrality-
The court,
having derived a principle from either the text or original intent, must apply
it to all cases which it reasonably relates.
-
if
rigorously applied, would continue to a doctrinal formula, i.e. 14th
amendment would allow official segregation b/c original intent did not
contemplate it
-
Brown
v. Board demonstrates that there is tension b/w political mandate and
neutrality
-
Neutrality
cant explain why there are various degrees of treatment (i.e. treating
historically disadvantaged groups differently)
-
It
could be used as disguise for result-oriented jurisprudence & blindly
follows precedent w/o taking into account different principles.
4.
Structuralism-
The documental structure
is necessary to understand the great objects of the Constitution
-
i.e.
workable government b/c 3 distinct articles or first amendment most important
-
it
is as debatable as is unprovable: the context in which it was created may have
a role (i.e. economic disarray at the time created focus on economic concerns)
-
the
principles attributed to document may be subjective inferences
5. Non-interpretivism-
The
constitutional meaning can be glossed from outside the Constitution.
-
responsible
for creating fundamental rights: test of deeply rooted in nations traditions
or consciousness and implicit in the ordered liberty
-
how
an issue is resolved is determined by how it seen (subjective). Bowers v.
Hardwick: majority asked if homosexual sodomy was grounded in nations ideals
whereas dissent asked if personal autonomy encompassed this.
-
Translates
into a respect for popular will (i.e. desegregation)
-
Assume
the political risk of constitutional results inspired by competing
moralites/ideologies.
6.
Voidism-
If the
Constitution does not speak clearly, then it does not speak at all &
democratic majority should decide it (court stands aside).
-
hard
to differentiate b/w when the it is silent & when it has been denied.
-
Risks
minimizing judiciarys function to the point that constitutional guarantees
themselves become marginally relevant
-
Under
the guise of judicial restraint, the court may realign & redistribute
rights (i.e. Establishment clauses meaning is indeterminate so voidism would
just strike it out).
Yes. The
Fourteenth Amendment bind state governments: [...] No State shall make or
enforce any law which abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
Art IV, § 2 binds the Fed government: The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.
Justice
Taneys opinion in Dred Scott was
one of the first examples textually unenumerated rights. The 14th Am soon became a focal
point for fundamental rights. Its precursor was the Civil Rights Act of 1866
which said that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or
immunities
on account of race
.
Corfield v. Coryell (1823)
Articulates
privileges and immunities which are fundamental (referring to Art IV, §2) &
belong, of right, to citizens of all free govts. These rights are generally: (1) Protection by the government; (2) Enjoyment of life and liberty; (3) the right to acquire property and
to pursue happiness and safety; and (4)
the right to pass through; or to reside in any other state and to enjoy
equanimity with other citizens of the state before the law. This latter right is controlling in this
case.
The
14th Amend was intended to incorporate the Civil Rights Act of 1866. CRA was
supposed to secure Fed citizenship. The 14th Amend was adopted in the event
that the southern states rejoined the union.
Do
the Civil War amendments grant United States
citizens broad protection against the actions of state governments?
No.
Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)
Facts:
LA passed a law giving
a monopoly of New Orleans
slaughter houses to a particular company. Butchers claimed that statute
deprived them of their right to practice trade violating the 13th and 14th
Amend b/c denied privileges and immunities of LA citizenship.
Holding:
14th Amend was race
specific. Its one purpose was the freedom of slaves, and the establishment
& protection of that freedom. Distinguished b/w US citizenship & State
citizenship (based on the first sentence of 14th Amend). Fundamental civil
rights (like this one) are domain of states. The rights of US citizenship
could not be infringed upon by states.
RULE:
This case stands for
the proposition that (1) the right
to pursue lawful occupation is not a privilege and immunity that an article III
court can hold that a state must recognize and protect where the state has not
undertaken to recognize and protect such a right. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be construed to provide a
fundamental right to pursue occupation, without obstacles to pursuit of
occupation is not deprivation of property right that is a fundamental right. (3) The 14th Amendment was intended to
account for the freedom of the slaves, but it does not only apply to Negroes.
Facts: Newly arrived resident of California brought
action against California
b/c California,
acting under express congressional authority, limited the welfare benefits of
anyone who had resided in the state for less than one year by limiting the
maximum amount to the rate of their prior state. 45 other states had lower welfare benefits
than CA.
Holding: The proffered legitimate state interest
of saving money is not justification for a decision to discriminate against
citizens who travel to that state because they are entitled to the privileges
and immunities of all other citizens of that state. The right to travel has three components: (1)
The right of a citizen to enter and to leave another state; (2) the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second state; and (3) A traveler who elects
to become a permanent resident has a right to be treated like any other citizen
of that state.
The majority
& dissent recognized that right to travel component 3 is protected in P or
I clause. Thus the test is strict scrutiny.
a)
the
number of people moving for higher welfare benefits is small & CA has a
higher cost of living, CA said they did not pass the legislation to prevent
that (Roe v. Anderson, 1998) and if it were it is an impermissible
justification (Shapiro v. Thompson).
b)
The
issue is not whether CA has a legit interest. Rather CA cannot meet this
legitimate interest with discriminatory shemes
c)
Neither
the duration of residency or state of prior residence does not have anything to
do with the need of recipients.
DISTINCTION B/W
ART IV (P & I) & AM 14 (P or I).
14 Am bars
state from abridging national citizenship
Art IV protects
right of state citizenship when a non-resident is not treated same as a
resident
b. The Rise of Substantive Due
Process Review (pg. 194)
Yes.
Loan Assoc. v. City of Topeka (1874)
Facts:
Justice Miller struck
down a local giving relocating businesses a preferential tax rate. Tax had no
public character, but was purely in aid of private or personal objects beyond
the legislative power and unauthorized invasion of private right.
(1)
America,
as a govt and country, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.
(2)
Implied reservations of individual rights/Essential nature of all free govts.
Ψ Griswold v. Conn (1965- J.Black)
Blacks
Dissent- The due
process clause did not vest the judiciary with the power to measure
constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our
notions of civilized standards of conduct.
In
critique of the majoritys striking down of legislation without identifying a
specific constitutional right violation. The majority abandoned the restraint
of its Slaughter House reasoningbeginning of substantive due process review.
Evolution
of economic rights doctrine was advanced further when the court indicated theat
the due process clause might function as a check on legislative power.
Ψ Munn v. Illinois (1876)
Facts:
Court declined to
consider the reasonableness of grain elevator rate regulation b/c the activity
concerned a public interest. It did note that the reasonableness of
private contracts unrelated to any public interest would be judicially
ascertained.
Laid
down additional groundwork for closer review of any regulation affecting
economic interests.
Ψ Railroad Commission Cases (1886)
Facts:
Court upheld the
States railroad rate regulation but reiterated its interest in scrutinizing
its wisdom. The court pointed out that regulations cannot work to the
equivalent of a TAKING without just compensation.
Ψ Mugler v. Kansas (1887)
Court
upheld a State ban on the sale of liquor. Court recognized that the State has
an interest in controlling activity that will injuriously affect the public.
However, it alluded to its willingness to review the substance of the States
legislation:
[The
courts] solemn duty- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislation has transcended the limits of its
authority
If a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial
relation to those objects
The
court evaluates the substantial relation or the lack thereof.
Facts: LAs law prohibiting out-of-state
insurance contracts that hadnt been certified by LA.
Holding: Through the Due Process Clause, the Allegeyer court struck down a Louisiana statute. LAs
regulations were struck down on jurisdictional grounds.
What does
Allgeyer signify?
(1) Proponent
for laissez-faire govt ideology.
(2) Profound departure
from Slaughter-houses race specific 14th Amend analysis.
Wage
and hour regulation of baking industry violates liberty of contract and thus
violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment.
Facts.
Lochner (D) was convicted of permitting an
employee to work for him more than the statutory maximum of 60 hours per
week. D appeals, claiming the law
violated his freedom to contract under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Issue. May a state generally prohibit private
agreements to work more than a specified number of hours?
Held.
No.
Judgment reversed.
(1) The general right to contract in business is
clearly part of the individual liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the right to hold
both property and liberty are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be
imposed by a government pursuant to its police powers.
(2) An earlier law restricting the work hours in
certain dangerous occupations was upheld.
The law here challenged, however, has no reference whatever to the
health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public. The state claims an interest in the
individual worker's health, but this goes too far; the individual's liberty
must impose some restraint on the police power.
(3) This is not a substitution of the Court's
judgment for the legislature's but
merely a determination of whether the attempted regulation is within the
state's police power.
Dissent
(Harlan): accepts the
govts contention that the statute intended to protect the well-being of bakers.
Whether or not this be wise legislation is not the province of the court to
inquire.
Dissent
(Holmes): refused to
indulge any assessment of legislative goals or means. Holmes believed this
Lochner-type substantive due process review allowed courts the opportunity to
second-guess legislative judgments. The court substitutes its own social and
economic theories.
Muller v. Oregon
(1908)
The
court ruled that a state may encroach on freedom of contract where an Oregon statute barred
women, members of a purported "weaker class" from working in
factories or laundries for more than 10
hours a day. Court held that
women needed special protection.
Holding:
State had not exceeded
its police power (1) The right to be free to K is a fundamental
right
BUT (2) women are weaker, inferior creatures in need of the States
protection (3) legitimate public interest in taking steps to promote women who
can produce vigorous offspring (4) the influence of vigorous health upon the
future well-being of the race is compromised when women have to work standing
more than 10hrs/day. (5) women are not self-reliant, nor can they assert their
full rights.
Policy:
Broad 14th Amend rights
superceded by strong countervailing State interests. Balancing.
Traux v. Corrigan (1921- Justice Holmes)
(1)
hates the expansion of 14th Amend beyond the absolute compulsion of its
words.
(2)
Sees the 14th Amend right expansion as an experiment in social engineering
geared toward satisfying powerful interest groups.
Baldwin v. Missouri (1930)
Dissent
(Holmes): expressed his
anxiety over the ever increasing scope given to the 14th Amend, which
necessarily cuts down the constitutional rights of the states.
14th
Amend is not a carte blanche to embody the courts economic and moral beliefs.
Holmes
position started to gain greater support by these later courts.
Facts: NY established a regulatory scheme for
fixing milk prices.
Holding: State did not overstep its police
powers. Why:
(1) Public
interest not limited to utilities or monopolies (Lochner)
(2) Presumption
that states have the right to impose regulations on businesses, including price
fixing, and that the regulations were properly enacted.
New Policy
(Holmes-type): Price
control is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the Legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary or unwarranted interference with individual. Due Process only demands that the measure not
be arbitrary or capricious. This case
rejects the distinction between industry clothed and not clothed in the public
interest.
c. Economic Liberty Since 1937 (pg. 207).
What
standard of review do we use when economic rights are infringed on by a state
law?
Facts:
Minimum wage law
fetters parties right to freely contract. Parrish employed as a chambermaid
filed suit to recover the difference in the wages received and the states
minimum wage fixed by law. The hotel claims that the minimum wage law
interferes with the right to contract and violates the 14th Amend. The hotel
relies on Adkins v. Childrens Hospital (1923fed min. wage law violated
14th amendment).
Holding:
The legislature is
free to recognize degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those
classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. If the law presumably hits the evil where it
is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied. Adkins is OVERRULED.
Dissent:
(1)
Const is a living
document but it doesnt change with the ebb and low of economic events.
(2)
Adkins should be
affirmed. Adkins is good law. Facts of this case is identical with Adkins and
therefore, should be dismissed.
(3)
Doesnt recognize
gender as anything that can disadvantage the ability to enter into a K. Women
dont need additional State protection. (contrary to Muller v. Oregon with the
vigorous offspring).
For
more than a decase now, the court has persistently refused to allow economic
freedom to be incorporated into the 14th Amend due process clause.
United
States v. Carolene
Products Co. (1938)
Facts:
Carolene Products challenged the constitutionality
of Congress statute restricting the interstate commerce of milk products.
Carolene Products claims this Filled Milk Act exceeds Congress Commerce
Clause authority.
Holding:
Congress
may prohibit interstate shipment of food products that it deems injurious to
the public health. Why:
(1) The existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed.
(2) Unless even the assumed facts couldnt possibly rest
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.
Olsen v. Nebraska (1941)
Facts: State law fixed that maximum compensation of a private
employment agency may collect from an applicant for employment. The employment
agency claims a violation of its 14th Amend rights. The Court of Nebraska
agreed.
Holding: The price fixing is constitutional. Why:
(1) Court presumed
that the increased competition of public employment, and labor unions have
curbed the excessive fees by private agencies.
(2) Presumably, no
conditions which the legislature might reasonably believe would rebound to the
public injury unless corrected by legislation.
Policy:
(1) Court doesnt
and shouldnt concern itself with the wisdom of the legislation.
(2) The state does
not have to prove the rationality behind its decisions.
Whalen v. Roe (1977).
Facts: NY state passed legislation requiring all pharmacists to
submit the names and addresses of all persons who obtain certain drugs
prescribed by a doctor into a centralized computer recording system. The
district court found that the State could not demonstrate the necessity for the
patient-identification requirement.
Holding: State legislation which has some effect on individual
liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional simply b/c a court finds it
unnecessary, in whole or in part. NY States efforts to minimize the use of
dangerous drugs through this reporting system is reasonable.
ACCOUNTING FOR ECONOMIC RIGHTS-BEYOND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (pg. 218)
1. The Contract Clause - Art. I §
10
Prior to the
rise of substantive due process review, the K clause was the primary check upon
State economic regulation.
Two Part
decision:
1.
The use of the K clause
to protect public agreements, i.e. those to which the government is a party.
Strict scrutiny employed in the first category.
AND
2.
The use of the clause to protect agreements between private parties.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)
Facts: Trustees of Dart Coll and the state of New Hampshire entered
into a K. The state sought to revoke the schools charter.
Holding: The state unconstitutionally impaired
the obligation of a K. Any impairment on the obligations due under a K is
unconstitutional.
Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co. (1983)
Facts: The regulation being challenged was a Kansas statute which
prevented Energy reserves Group (ERG), a natural gas supplier, from increasing
the prices it charged to Kansas
power as an esclation clause in the ERG-KPL K permitted.
Holding: The state does not unconstitutionally
impair the obligations due under the ERG-KPL K.
3 Part
Test:
1. Threshold
inquiry: Whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship.
- Does not
have to be a total destruction of contractual obligations.
- Has this
particular industry been regulated in the past.
2. legitimate
public purpose: if the state law substantially impairs, then the state must
have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation.
- Such as
remedying broad & general social or economic problems.
- Identifying
a legitimate state interest guarantees that the State is exercising its police
power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests.
3. Once a
legitimate public purpose has been identified: Whether the means to the end are
reasonable and appropriate.
**** Unless
the State is a contracting party, the court will defer to legislative judgment
as to the necessity & reasonableness of a particular measure.
Private Contracts:
Facts: MN enacted a law which required closing
companies to vest pension benefits to employees whod worked with the companies
for 10 yrs or more. Allieds pension plan did not vest until long after 10 yrs
and, could also be terminated at any time, with no obligation to those
employees with whom the pension plan had not yet vested.
Holding: The state law unconstitutionally impairs
upon contractual rights and obligations.
(1) Does the
law substantially impair a contractual relationship? The severity of the
impairment will determine the height of the hurdle [that] the state
legislation must clear.
a. minimal alteration will end the
inquiry here, at the first stage.
b.
severe impairment will push the inquiry to careful examination of the nature
and purpose of the states legislation.
Prong 1:
Severe impairment
- The company
had no reason to anticipate that its employees pension rights could..[vest]
except in accordance with the terms of the plan.
- It relied
heavily & reasonably, on this legitimate contractual expectation.
Therefore:
o (1) is there an emergency basis to this
severe modification
o is it for the protection of a basic
societal interest, and not for a favorable group
o is the relief appropriately tailored
o are the modifications reasonable
o is the statute limited to the duration
of the emergency
Rule App: Statute failed prongs 1 and 2 (no
emergency, only a limited number of employees would benefit).
Court implied
3, 4, 5, specific to a company like Allied, were not met either.
Facts: AL increased its severance taxes on oil
& gas and prohibited oil & gas producers from passing on the increase
directly, or indirectly, to consumers. This prohibition had the effect of
blocking Exxon from taking advantage of clauses in its existing contracts
permitting it to pass on tax increases to its customers.
Holding: It was not unconstitutionally impairing
on contractual right or expectation.
(1) A statute
does not violate the K Clause simply because it has the effect of restricting,
or even barring altogether, the performance of duties created by the Ks entered
into prior to its enactment. Otherwise, you could obtain immunity from state
regulation by making private contractual arrangements.
(2) The pass-
through prohibition did not prescribe a rule limited in effect to contractual
obligations or remedies, but instead imposed a generally applicable rule of
conduct designed to advance a broad social interest-to protect consumers from
excessive prices.
(3) (a) Distinguished from Allied Structural
Steel:
-
MN statute directly adjusted the rights & responsibilities f contracting
parties.
(b) Relied on Producers Transportation Co. v.
Railroad Commn of CA (1920).
-
State law authorized a state commission to set the rates of transporting oil by
pipeline. Court found that a common carrier cannot bark on the state not
imposing regulations on the carriers rates & practices.
(c)
If a state can set rates charged to consumers, a state can tell producers to
absorb the cost of a tax increase.
United States Trust Co. Of NY v. NJ
(1977-J.Blackmun)
Facts: In a 1962 bond using the Port Authority
of NY and NJ promised bondholders that certain revenues pledged as security for
the bonds would not be used to finance unprofitable passenger railroad systems
in the future. In 1974, NY and NJ retroactively repealed this covenant, so that
the pledged revenues could be used to improve rail services. US Trust, one of
the bondholders, sued on the grounds that the repeal violated the contractual
clause.
Holding: The states repeal of the covenant
constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of expected contractual
rights/benefits. Why:
When a State
impairs the obligation of its own K, the reserved powers doctrine has a different
basis. The k clause does not require a State to adhere to a K that surrenders
an essential attribute of its sovereignty.
TEST: (1) Is the contractual impairment reasonable
and necessary to
(2) support an important
public purpose
Rule App: The repeal was neither necessary to
achievement of the plan nor reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Necessity:
only when the states
public interest objectives could not be met by less drastic modification.
Reasonable:
only if the
modification was induced by unforeseen developments occurring after the
original K was made.
***Because
the State is one of contractual parties, lower level of deference given (danger
of state acting in its own self-interest).
Dissent:
Brennan, White,
and Marshall:
contractual
clause indistinguishable from due process clause. Taking Clause. Doesnt like
the expansion of the contractual clause. Only a reasonable justification should
be needed in order to modify a prior public contract.
Yes. But government has to pay a fair price or
provide just compensation.
2 Major issues: taking or regulation?
1.
What is the border line
between a taking and a mere regulationthe latter is noncompensatory.
2.
When is a taking made
for private rather than public use so that there is no right of eminent
domain.
Fed and State Government Bound?
Yes.
2 views, same result:
1.
5th Amendment is directly incorporated into the 14th amendment
2.
14th Amendment implicitly contains the same ban on takings as does the more
explicit 5th Amendment.
Either
way, legislation intimating a Taking will be subject to strict scrutiny review.
General Principles:
(1)
It is not a taking if:
(a) it substantially advances a legitimate
state interest; AND
( b) it does not deny an owner
economically viable use of his land.
Prong
a- Broad range of
govt purposes constituting legitimate State interest. There must be a
relatively tight fit btw the State interest and the regulation chosen. (More
than mere rational relation btw. the means and the ends.)
Prong
b: typically
regulations which deny the right to build any dwelling will be seen as a Taking.
Easements, Permanent fixtures, Drastic reduction in value (physical occupation)
are Takings.
Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.
The ability to
run and attach cable wires and other fixtures in private apartments constituted
a Taking via physical occupation. A per se Taking.
The courts
role in reviewing legislative judgment of what constitutes a public taking is
extremely narrowGreat Deference to States identification of Public Use.
Ψ Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984)
Facts: HI undertakes a massive land
redistribution program to decentralize the holding of property by a select
elite few HIans.
Holding: The test: So long as the states use of
its eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose the public use requirement is satisfied. As with any
other state conduct sought to be justified as an exercise of the police power,
all that was required was that the legislature rationally could have believed
that the act would promote a legitimate objective, the scheme here easily
passed this test. The public use requirement is thus coterminous with the
scope of a sovereigns police powers.
o
Can
have public use even though there is a transfer from one individual to another.
o
Eminent
domain and the scope of police power are coterminous.
